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Detecting Communities Using Coordination Games : A
Short Paper
Radhika Arava 1 and Pradeep Varakantham2
Abstract. Communities typically capture homophily as people of
the same community share many common features. This paper is mo-
tivated by the problem of community detection in social networks,
as it can help improve our understanding of the network topology.
Given the selﬁsh nature of humans to align with like-minded people,
we employ game theoretic models and algorithms to detect commu-
nities in this paper. Speciﬁcally, we employ coordination games to
represent interactions between individuals in a social network. We
provide a novel and scalable two phased algorithm NashOverlap to
compute an accurate overlapping community structure in the given
network. We evaluate our algorithm against the best existing meth-
ods for community detection and show that our algorithm improves
signiﬁcantly on benchmark networks with respect to standard nor-
malised mutual information measure.
1 Introduction
In social networks like Facebook, Google+, there can be overlap in
user’s high-school friends’ circle and his university friends’ circle.
It is important to identify the overlapping community structure of a
social network, as it helps in understanding the network topology, the
spread of information, rumor in that network.
In this paper, we provide a novel, scalable two-phase algorithm
NashOverlap to compute the overlapping community structure of a
network. We evaluate our algorithm against the current state of the
art and we ﬁnd that it works signiﬁcantly better than the best existing
methods on the standard LFR benchmark networks [2]. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst game theory based scalable over-
lapping community detection algorithm that can detect an accurate
community structure for a given social network.
2 Community Detection Problem
In a social network G = (V,E,w), V is the set of vertices and E is
the set of undirected edges that represents relationships between ver-
tices in the network and w : E → R is the weight function on edges.
A community in a social network is a non-empty connected subset of
vertices with denser connections within themselves than with the rest
of the network. Formally, ifCj ⊆ V denotes a community j, then our
goal is to identify the community structure Γ = {C1, C2, . . . , Cr},
where
⋃
j Cj = V .
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3 Algorithm NashOverlap
We design a novel two-phased algorithmNashOverlap to detect over-
lapping communities in a social network as illustrated in Figure (1).
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Figure 1. Algorithm: NashOverlap
3.1 First Phase
In this phase, we compute edge-closeness value p(i, j) for each edge
(i, j) and compute an intermediate partition of the network by solv-
ing k graph coordination games independently using local search.
Given a weighted network G(V,E,w), we formulate each game,
ζ1 = (V, (Si)i∈V , (ui)i∈V ), where V is the set of players, Si consti-
tutes the set of r (r ≥ 2) strategies for each player i and ui is the util-
ity function for each player i. Let si ∈ {1, . . . , r} denote the strategy
that player i chooses; then (si)i∈V deﬁnes a strategy proﬁle of the
game. Let s−i denote the strategies of all the other players other than
i. Utility of a player i at a given strategy proﬁle s = (si, s−i) is
given by
ui(si, s−i) =
∑
j:(i,j)∈E
si=sj
t(i, j) (1)
where tie-strength t(i, j) of an edge (i, j) is deﬁned as:
t(i, j) = w(i, j) +
∑
k:(i,k)∈E
(k,j)∈E
(w(i, k) + w(j, k)) . (2)
We solve the above graph coordination game ζ1 using local search
in the following way. Initially, assign to each vertex i ∈ V , a strategy
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picked uniformly from Si. Pick a uniform random vertex-ordering
and each vertex i during its turn picks the strategy si ∈ Si, whichever
gives him the maximum utility.
This is repeated with the same vertex-ordering until game ζ1 con-
verges to a Nash equilibrium. We deﬁne edge-closeness value p(i, j)
of an edge as the proportion of k games in which its vertices choose
the same strategy at Nash equilibrium.
We now show that ζ1 is a potential game with the potential func-
tion Φ1 : {1, 2, . . . , r}|V | → R that is deﬁned as:
Φ1 =
∑
(i,j)∈E\Ec
t(i, j),
where Ec is the set of cut-edges.
Theorem 1 Φ1 is a weighted potential function.
We construct an intermediate partition which is the set of con-
nected components containing only edges with p(i, j) ≥ 0.95.
3.2 Second Phase
This phase takes care of the mistakenly identiﬁed edges in the in-
termediate partition of ﬁrst phase using p(i, j) values and outputs a
stable overlapping community structure.
Deﬁnition 1 Given a vertex i and a community C, deﬁne the
community-closeness, p(i, C) as the sum of edge-closeness values
between i and C. That is,
p(i, C) =
∑
j:(i,j)∈E
j∈C
p(i, j).
Intuitively, a vertex is said to be adjacent to a community, if it
has any of its adjacent vertices in that community. If a vertex is not
adjacent to a community, its community-closeness to that community
is 0.
Consider a game ζ2 = (V, (Si)i∈V , (ui)i∈V ) where Si for each
vertex i is the set of all communities, ui is the sum of vertex i′s
community-closeness values to all its adjacent communities.
We solve this graph coordination game using local search. Pick
a random vertex-ordering and each vertex in its turn, computes its
community-closeness to each of its adjacent communities. The ver-
tex chooses to be a part of only those communities to which its
community-closeness is at least α times its maximum community-
closeness value, given that its utility increases with that decision. The
vertex-ordering is repeated, until the game converges to a Nash equi-
librium.
For a given overlapping community structure Γ, we shall duplicate
every vertex in each of its overlapping communities. Let Ci be the
set of communities of player i in a given overlapping community
structure Γ. So, we put a copy of vertex i in each of its communities
C ∈ Ci. Observe that if the community structure is not overlapping,
then Ci is of size 1 for each player i.
Let ζ2 be a potential game with potential function Φ2 :
{C1, C2, . . . , C|V |} → R that is given by
Φ2 =
1
2
·
∑
i∈V
C∈Ci
p(i, C) (3)
Theorem 2 Φ2 is a weighted potential function.
α is a overlap parameter and lies in [0, 1]. If α = 1, the resulting
community structure has no overlap.
3.3 Discussion
We show that the games ζ1 and ζ2 always converges to a local opti-
mum. Though, the problem of computing the local optimum for all
these games is PLS-Complete, we can allow for minor changes in the
game parameters and show that we can compute a stable overlapping
community structure in linear time (linear in the number of edges).
For every network, given its community structure, mixing param-
eter μ is deﬁned as the fraction of a vertex’s links that connect to
vertices sharing no communities. For fuzzier networks(μ > 0.5),
our algorithm is likely to converge to global optimum. However for
networks with μ < 0.5, our algorithm detects an accurate overlap-
ping community structure. We choose k = 100 and vary α in [0, 1]
for our experiments.
We compared the performance of our algorithm against current
best algorithms: CFinder [5], OSLOM [4], COPRA [1], SLPA [6]
with respect to a standard measure Normalized Mutual Informa-
tion [3] on networks with varying network sizes, community sizes,
overlapping membership and mixing parameter. NashOverlap out-
performed all the other algorithms, with respect to NMI measure in
all experimental settings. We provide results for a setting that is rep-
resentative of the comparison results observed over all the parameter
settings in Table 1.
om SLPA COPRA CFinder OSLOM NashOv
2 0.87444 0.95993 0.36046 0.97164 0.968639
3 0.79596 0.89308 0.3135 0.89679 0.94078
4 0.75394 0.80646 0.37866 0.82748 0.877891
5 0.692 0.74409 0.36277 0.76214 0.787768
6 0.65122 0.69011 0.32862 0.7129 0.727489
7 0.60913 0.64374 0.34251 0.66702 0.678984
8 0.56703 0.59485 0.34953 0.62428 0.63227
Table 1. Comparison of NMI measure for all algorithms on 5000 vertex
networks varying overlapping membership (om) from 2 to 8 and community
sizes in the range [20, 100] for μ = 0.5 and on = 10%.
We believe that these results along with the simplicity of our algo-
rithm can help in understanding the topology of networks efﬁciently.
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